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As there is no general right to be defended from flooding, any measures taken to protect 
communities from flooding would appear to be motivated by political considerations. This 
article explores the possibilities open to a party seeking to benefit from flood defences on 
another person’s land. The possibilities include an action in nuisance (which is the most 
promising area, but is still beset by issues of causation and the possibility that the extent of 
the duty imposed on a defendant landowner is not by any means certain to extend to the 
actual repair of existing flood defences) and an attempt to establish prescriptive liability. 
Other avenues of legal recourse are more fraught and therefore less likely to prove useful 
here. The article concludes that the possibilities covered are of limited value in most cases 
and suggests that an alternative approach to flood defences might be used to achieve wider 




We all have a right to be defended from flooding. That is the conclusion we may be forgiven 
for drawing from then prime minister David Cameron’s oft-quoted speech in February 2014 
following severe flooding in the Somerset levels: ‘… money is no object in this relief effort. 
Whatever money is needed for it will be spent. We will take whatever steps are necessary’.1 
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Indeed, the residents of Fairbourne in West Wales (a village built on land reclaimed from the 
sea and which sits only a few metres above sea level) are hoping for similar sentiments 
following the recent decision taken by Gwynnedd Council to stop funding maintenance of the 
sea wall protecting Fairbourne2 and allow managed realignment of the coast in that area. 
 
Unfortunately for the residents of Fairbourne, and as this article will show, whilst there may 
be a few possibilities (some in more obscure areas of the law on flooding), there is no such 
general right to flood defences in UK law. The action taken by the government in response to 
the Somerset levels flooding appears on the face of it to have been motivated by political 
considerations and not by any legal rights of those living and working in the area. 
 
This article will look at the possibilities open to those seeking to claim the protection of flood 
defences that are not within their property (which in essence is a claim to force the owner of 
the flood defences to repair and maintain those defences), starting with the position in statute 
law and following on with the various opportunities available at common law, including an 





The statute law on flood defences has traditionally been divided into two areas: inland areas 
(dealt with under three Acts of 1991 covering land drainage, water resources and the water 
industry,3 along with the Environment Act 1995) and coastal areas (dealt with under the 
Coast Protection Act 1949). The more recent Flood and Water Management Act 2010 
attempts to merge the two regimes to a certain extent. However, all these Acts are notable for 
the overall lack of any duties on the parts of the public bodies concerned, other than in 
respect of flood risk planning and flood warning systems.4 The sections enabling the relevant 
public authorities to erect and maintain flood defences are all expressed as powers;5 in other 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1 From transcript of the Rt Hon David Cameron’s statement on the UK storms and flooding, (11 February 2014) 
www.gov.uk/government/speeches/david-camerons-statement-on-the-uk-storms-and-flooding. 
2 Richard Spillett ‘Village of the DAMMED: entire Welsh village to be “decommissioned” and its population 
forced to move after government warns it will be lost to the sea’ Daily Mail (11 February 2016) 
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3442264/Welsh-village-decommissioned-warnings-lost-sea.html. 
3 Land Drainage Act 1991, Water Resources Act 1991 and Water Industry Act 1991. 
4 William Howarth ‘Legal perspectives on flooding: Canute, Foster and the Flood and Water Management Act 
2010’ (2014) 85 Journal of Environmental Law 21. 
5 For example see Water Resources Act 1991 s 165 in relation to main rivers. 
words, it is within the discretion of the body given the power whether to exercise it. Just 
because public authorities may have the legal power to act does not mean that they also have 
a duty to act. Without a statutory duty to provide adequate flood defences, anyone suffering 
from the absence of such flood defences is unlikely to be able to persuade a court to step in 
and compel the relevant public body to exercise its statutory discretionary powers.6 
 
In spite of this, for a time Peter Marcic looked to have found a general right to be defended 
from flooding.7 In his case, a sewerage undertaker was found civilly liable by the Court of 
Appeal for its failure to prevent repeated sewer floods affecting his property.8 As 
contemporary commentators noted,9 this potentially opened the way for a general right to 
flood defences of a character that would have been incredibly difficult to fund and potentially 
impossible to deliver; flooding is a natural phenomenon over which humans cannot have 
complete control. (Even sewer flooding, which is less of a purely ‘natural’ event (involving 
the backing up of engineered waste water collection systems) than a cloudburst, did not (pre-
Marcic) necessarily impose a liability to act, in this case, on the utility company.) It may 
seem trite, but the legend of Canute holds true. Humans cannot hope to hold the waters back 
completely; the best we can aim for is to provide protection against a certain level of flood 
risk, at a cost that has been justified as reasonable in light of that risk. 
 
Luckily for those responsible for flood defences, the Court of Appeal in Marcic was 
overruled by the House of Lords.10 The Lords held that the proper course of action for Mr 
Marcic should have been to have recourse to the statutory scheme provided in the Water 
Industry Act 1991 and that to allow redress through the common law would run counter to 
the intention of Parliament in setting up such an ‘elaborate’ statutory enforcement and 
compensation scheme.11 
 
Marcic therefore reaffirmed the principle that where a statutory authority is given a power to 
take a course of action, the court will generally not step in and make policy decisions on the 
                                                          
6 Bybrook Barn Garden Centre Limited v Kent County Council [2001] Env LR 543 (CA). 
7 Marcic v Thames Water Utilities [2002] EWCA Civ 64, [2002] QB 929 (CA). 
8 Although this was under the common law principles set out in Leakey v National Trust for Places of Historic 
Interest or National Beauty [1980] QB 485 (CA) (see later for a full discussion of these principles) as the 
sewerage company owned the sewer that was the cause of the flooding on Mr Marcic’s property.  
9 William Howarth ‘Flood defence law after Marcic’ (2003) 5(1) Environmental Law Review 23. 
10 Marcic v Thames Water Utilities [2003] UKHL 66, [2004] 2 AC 42 (HL). 
11 ibid [57] (Lord Nicholls). 
part of the statutory authority as to whether that power should be used in a specific case. All 
of which leaves landowners unable to require flood defence authorities to provide or maintain 
flood defences as a statutory right.  
 
It should be noted that the Marcic case also involved a claim that the actions taken by the 
defendant sewerage authority were a breach of Mr Marcic’s human rights. This claim was 
also unsuccessful in the end (on the basis that the scheme was broadly fair and fairly applied), 
although it is unlikely that it will be the last attempt to use human rights legislation to attain 
protection from flooding. A detailed consideration of the possibility of a claim for a breach of 
human rights is beyond the scope of this article; however, the same reasoning would apply to 






At common law there is no specific right to be defended from flooding. There are, however, a 
few opportunities for a party suffering from flooding coming from another party’s land to 
seek to ameliorate their situation. The main opportunity is through the developments in 
nuisance and negligence law brought about by the judgment in Leakey v National Trust.12 
This will be discussed in detail below, along with a number of other limited opportunities 




The system of riparian rights comes into play when both parties own land abutting a natural 
watercourse or where both parties own land abutting tidal waters.13 It is less likely, therefore, 
that the flood defences on one party’s land would benefit a neighbouring property that also 
abutted the watercourse. The more likely situation is that such flood defences would increase 
the risk of flooding on such a neighbouring property.  
 
                                                          
12 Leakey and Others v National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty [1980] QB 485 (CA). 
13 Reece v Miller (1882) 8 QBD 626. 
A full discussion of the remedies available to such a neighbouring landowner are beyond the 
scope of this article;14 however, it should be noted that a riparian owner is generally permitted 
to take reasonable action to prevent his or her land flooding, even if that might increase the 
risk of flooding for a neighbouring riparian owner. There are some circumstances in which 
this general rule will not apply and it is important also to remember the qualification that the 
principles of Leakey will apply (see further below for a full discussion of these principles) 
and so there must be a balancing exercise between what it is reasonable for the riparian owner 
to do to protect his own land and what it is reasonable to expect from the riparian owner with 
regard to preventing or minimising damage to any other riparian owners, whether upstream or 
downstream. 
 
Nuisance and negligence 
 
Which one? 
At common law, a party seeking to assert a right to be defended from flooding by existing 
flood defences situated on someone else’s land is likely to base its claim on either nuisance or 
negligence. As confirmed by Lord Cooke in the Delaware Mansions case, there is no longer 
any real distinction between nuisance and negligence in this area; rather, the key 
consideration is the concept of ‘reasonableness between neighbours’.15 
 
However, although Lord Cooke’s statement means that the considerations to be made will be 
similar in either area of law, the choice of the basis of a claim is still important. In the main, 
this is because the remedies available to a claimant differ. A claim in nuisance can be made in 
advance of any harm occurring, with the intention of seeking an injunction in order to prevent 
the commission of a prospective nuisance. In this case, the claimant would be seeking a 
mandatory injunction to compel the defendant to repair and maintain flood defences on its 
property in order to avoid damage to the claimant’s property by flooding as a result of the 
lack of repairs to the flood defences. At this stage it is important to note that a mandatory 
injunction will only be available if compensation with damages would not be suitable. 
 
                                                          
14 For a concise summary of riparian rights and flooding issues see John Bates ‘Flooding and private rights’ 
(2007) 18(5) Water Law 159–66. 
15 Delaware Mansions Limited v Westminster City Council [2001] UKHL 55, [2002] 1 AC 321, 332 (HL) (Lord 
Cooke of Thorndon). 
On the other hand, a claim in negligence only admits of a damages remedy and so it cannot 
be used in advance of flooding occurring. It would seem then that a claim in private nuisance 
would be the preferable course of action for our hypothetical claimant. However, there are 
circumstances in which such a claim would not be possible. At its heart, nuisance law is 
about rights and duties between landowners;16 where flooding has been caused (or allowed to 
occur) by the actions of parties other than the landowner (and where it is not possible to argue 
that the landowner adopted the nuisance),17 then negligence will be the only appropriate basis 
for a claim. 
 
Nuisance and negligence: the key considerations 
As Lord Cooke stated, both strands of law will now entail the same considerations in this 
area. However, to take a step back, before the evolution of the concept of reasonableness 
between neighbours, the leading authority in flooding cases was Thomas & Evans Ltd v Mid-
Rhondda Co-Operative Society Ltd.18 In that case the defendant took down and re-erected a 
flood defence situated on its land but which also protected the claimant’s land. The defendant 
failed to re-erect the flood defence adequately (leaving two small gaps in the defence to allow 
for the continued construction of the building the defendant was erecting on the site), with the 
result that flood water breached the defence and overflowed onto the claimant’s property, 
causing damage. The court held that the claimant had no right of action against the defendant 
on the basis that it had no right to call for the flood defence to be erected and therefore it 
could have no right to require the continued existence of the flood defence.19  
 
The principle that no one is entitled to require protection from flooding started to waver with 
the decision in Leakey v National Trust.20 Leakey confirmed in English law21 the concept that 
has become known as the ‘measured duty of care’: an occupier or landowner owes a duty to 
its neighbours to do what is reasonable in the circumstances to prevent or minimise the risk of 
harm to the neighbour from the property of the occupier or landowner. The Thomas case was 
                                                          
16 For further discussion of the suitability of nuisance or negligence as a basis for a claim in respect of flood 
damage see William Howarth Flood Defence Law (Shaw & Sons 2002) 82.  
17 As in Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880 (HL), in which the landowner was held to have 
adopted a nuisance created by a third party negligently placing a grate for a culvert on the landowner’s property 
in the wrong position, with the result that after a period of heavy rain some three years later, a neighbouring 
landowner’s property flooded.  
18 [1941] 1 KB 381 (CA), [1940] 4 All ER 357. 
19 ibid [389] (Sir Wilfred Greene MR). 
20 Leakey (n 12). 
21 Building on the duty set out in Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan (n 17). 
considered in Leakey and distinguished on the basis that it is lawful to take down a flood 
defence and so it is simply unlucky if the flood happens whilst the wall is down. 
 
However, the labelling of Thomas as consistent with the reasoning of Goldman v Hargrave22 
(such reasoning being the basis for the decision in Leakey) is problematic. Thomas was 
decided on the basis that there could be no general duty either to erect or thereafter maintain a 
flood defence for the benefit of another party. It appears to have been ‘distinguished’ on the 
basis that it is not unreasonable to take down a flood defence for the purpose of rebuilding it, 
which implies that the concept of reasonableness applies and that there could be a duty to 
maintain the flood defence if it would be unreasonable not to. This inconsistency was 
recognised in the Australian case of Elston23 and then in Green v Lord Somerleyton,24 where 
the court finally confirmed that the law had moved on from Thomas and that the measured 
duty of care was the applicable standard in cases of flooding.  
 
It is therefore now possible for a party suffering from flooding that entered its land from 
neighbouring land to establish liability on the part of the neighbouring landowner to prevent 
that flooding. This will require the claimant both to establish that the defendant owes it a duty 
of care and then also that the scope of that duty extends to preventing the flooding; as Megaw 
LJ noted in Leakey,25 the existence of a duty does not automatically mean that inaction will 
be a breach of that duty.  
 
In establishing the existence of a duty of care, a claimant will need to deal first with 
causation. It will be necessary to establish that the damage caused by flood waters was as a 
result of the failure on the part of the defendant to maintain or repair the flood defences on its 
land. If the flood might have occurred regardless of such failure, then the claimant will be 
unlikely to be able to establish causation. This will be most problematic in situations caused 
by extraordinary flooding at a level above that which the flood defences were intended to 
protect against, or in situations where the distance between the flood defence and the 
claimant’s land is more than minimal.  
 
                                                          
22 [1967] 1 AC 645 (PC Australia). 
23 Elston v Dore (1982) ALR 577 (Australian HC). 
24 [2003] EWCA Civ 198, [2004] 1 P & CR 33 (CA). 
25 Leakey (n 12) [518].  
Having established causation, the test for establishing a measured duty of care is set out in 
Goldman v Hargrave26 and requires the defendant to have known about the hazard (or ought 
to have known), for the consequences of not removing the hazard to have been foreseeable 
and for the defendant to have had the ability to remove the hazard.27 The last element seems 
to merge somewhat with the scope of the duty. 
 
In Leakey Megaw LJ set out the test for considering the scope of the duty: a defendant is 
under a duty to do what is reasonable for him to do in all the circumstances to prevent or 
minimise the risk of damage to the claimant’s property.28 In particular, regard must be paid to 
the cost of the work required to prevent or minimise the danger and a level of consideration 
given to the means of the defendant and the claimant.  
 
In Holbeck Hall Hotel v Scarborough Borough Council29 the Court of Appeal considered the 
scope of the measured duty of care. The Court confirmed that the ‘fair, just and reasonable’ 
test set out in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman30 must be applied both in determining 
whether to impose a duty of care and in determining the scope of that duty. In the Holbeck 
Hall case, the claimant owned a hotel near the edge of a cliff in North Yorkshire. The 
defendant council owned the land between the hotel and the cliff edge. The cliff was unstable 
and, following a slip, the defendant council called in engineers to inspect the cliff and 
recommend any suitable remedial measures. Some years later there was a massive slip and 
the defendant’s land and part of the claimant’s land collapsed. As a result, the hotel had to be 
demolished. 
 
The Court of Appeal held that while the Council had owed a duty of care to the claimants, the 
scope of that duty was limited to warning the claimants of the risks that it was aware of or 
ought to have foreseen and sharing any information relating to such risks that it acquired. The 
decision turned upon the foreseeability of the damage that had occurred (the damage being 
much greater than anyone had imagined) and the fact that the defect in the land causing the 
slip had existed as much in the claimants’ land as in the council’s land.  
 
                                                          
26 Goldman (n 22).  
27 The question of ability is discussed in detail later in this article. 
28 Leakey (n 12) [524] (Megaw LJ). 
29 [2000] QB 836 (CA). 
30 [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL). 
Following Holbeck Hall, a claimant seeking to make a defendant prevent damage from flood 
waters coming onto the claimant’s property from the defendant’s property will therefore need 
to show that it would be fair, just and reasonable for the measured duty of care to extend to 
what is possible will be the significant capital costs of the maintenance works that would be 
required.  
 
An additional possible caution should be noted from the case of Abbahall Ltd v Smee.31 That 
case concerned liability for repairs to the roof of a three-storey property, the ground floor of 
which was owned by the claimant and a flying freehold of the first and second floors of 
which was owned by the defendant. The defendant had failed to maintain the roof, with the 
result that water had leaked through and caused damage to the claimant’s ground floor 
property. It was accepted that the defendant owed a duty of care to the claimant, and so the 
case turned on the extent of that duty. Applying the Caparo test, the Court of Appeal held 
that it was only fair, just and reasonable that those who will share in the benefit of the works 
should share the burden of paying for them.  
 
Abbahall is not directly analogous to flooding cases involving adjoining properties. Indeed, in 
his judgment, Munby J noted that the decision was confined to the situation of flying 
freeholds and leaking roofs and that a different solution may be more appropriate in adjoining 
arrangements. He also noted that the decision might possibly have been different had the cost 
of the necessary repairs been much greater. Abbahall must therefore be considered, bearing 
these qualifications in mind. Nonetheless, the decision in Abbahall does mean that a claimant 
seeking to establish a liability in nuisance or negligence on the part of the defendant to 
maintain and repair an existing flood defence must consider the possibility that, should they 
be successful, they may be required to contribute to the costs of those repairs.  
 
Artificiality 
It is worth noting here that the measured duty of care will not apply in circumstances where 
there is an element of artificiality about the water involved. This is where, for example, the 
defendant landowner has brought water artificially onto his land,32 has artificially 
accumulated water that came naturally onto his land33 or has erected artificial structures on 
                                                          
31 [2002] EWCA Civ 1831, [2003] 1 WLR 1472 (CA). 
32 Baird v Williamson (1863) 143 ER 831. 
33 Whalley v Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co (1884) 13 QBD 131 (CA). 
his land that have caused water to flow onto the claimant’s land in a way that it would not 
have done without such structures.34 In all such cases, the applicable standard will be that of 
strict liability set out in Rylands v Fletcher,35 although even with strict liability, the defendant 
will only be liable for the damage caused as a result of the breach if such damage was 
foreseeable.36 
 
The obvious artificiality referred to above can be contrasted with the subtler artificiality of 
the English landscape. In Green v Lord Somerleyton37 Parker LJ considered the issue of 
artificiality in the context of an argument by the defence counsel that the measured duty of 
care did not apply in relation to naturally flowing water. This submission was dismissed on 
the basis that Leakey had held that the duty of care is owed in respect of a hazard on the 
defendant’s land, irrespective of whether that hazard is natural or man-made. 
 
The important point to note is that, in the discussion as to the artificiality or otherwise of the 
watercourses relevant in the Green case, Parker LJ remarked that a significant proportion of 
the English landscape was man-made at some point or other in history and that it would be 
virtually impossible to separate out those features that are completely free from the influence 
of man. Indeed, he stated that: ‘in the context of the English landscape a distinction between 
“natural” and “artificial” features is an inherently uncertain foundation on which to rest a 
decision as to the existence of liability in nuisance’.38  
 
Artificiality will therefore only be an issue in circumstances involving recent actions by the 
defendant or his predecessors in title and not in circumstances where the possible artificiality 
involved is in respect of the landscape that may have been influenced by man hundreds or 
even thousands of years ago.  
 
Party resources 
The issue of the resources of the parties involved in any matter was touched on when 
considering the scope of the measured duty of care above (with reference to Abbahall Ltd v 
Smee). It is worth expanding that consideration here as the matter has received some focus in 
                                                          
34 Hurdman v North Eastern Railway Co (1878) 3 CPD 168 (CA). 
35 (1868) LR 3 HL 330 (HL). 
36 Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264 (HL). 
37 Green v Lord Somerleyton (n 24) [541]. 
38 ibid (Parker LJ). 
the case law that has followed Leakey. It seems that a defendant will only be expected to do 
what is reasonable for him to do in the circumstances.  
 
In Leakey Megaw LJ stated that, where the action required to remove the hazard will cost 
money, ‘logic and good sense’ necessitate the consideration of the means of the defendant.39 
Similarly, the relative means of the claimant and therefore its ability to take its own remedial 
action should also be considered. In both cases, this should be a broad assessment and not a 
detailed consideration of the means of both parties. The distinction here is that the court will 
not be interested in a detailed account of the assets that each party owns, although it will 
consider any significant difference between the position of the two parties and, also, any 
significant difference between the position of either or both of the parties and the projected 
costs of the works required to alleviate the risk of flooding.40  
 
However, Abbahall v Smee41 considered the issue of the relevant means of the parties and 
held that neither Leakey nor Goldman v Hargrave should be held as authority for the 
proposition that the parties’ resources are the determining factor in establishing the scope of 
the duty of care. Indeed, there may be cases in which they are not relevant at all. As an 
illustration, in the Abbahall case the court held that the relevant circumstance was not that the 
defendant (who had not repaired the roof) was poor, but that she was choosing to live in a 
property with a roof that protected both her and her underneath neighbour, which she could 
not afford to maintain. The court found that in that circumstance (and having regard to the 
level of the specific costs involved, which were not considered to be excessive) it would not 
be fair, just or reasonable for the defendant to be able to avoid her responsibilities on account 
of her poverty.  
 
Any claimant seeking to establish liability on the part of a defendant to repair and maintain 
flood defences on its land will therefore need to consider the relative resources of the parties 
involved and whether this may mean that the scope of any duty that the defendant is subject 
                                                          
39 Leakey (n 12) [526]. 
40 See for example Megaw LJ’s illustration in Leakey (n 12) 524: ‘If a stream flows through A’s land, A being a 
small farmer, and there is a known danger that in times of heavy rainfall, because of the configuration of A’s 
land and the nature of the stream’s course and flow, there may be an overflow, which will pass beyond A’s land 
and damage the property of A’s neighbour: perhaps much wealthier neighbours. It may require expensive works, 
far beyond A’s means, to prevent or even diminish the risk of flooding. Is A to be liable for all the loss that 
occurs when the flood comes, if he has not done the impossible and carried out these works at his own 
expense?’. 
41 Abbahall Ltd v Smee (n 31). 
to will be limited to information sharing and/or allowing access to carry out any necessary 
remedial action.  
 
Statutory bodies 
At this stage, it is useful to consider statutory bodies again. In some cases (particularly those 
concerning coastal flooding) it may be that the flood defence the relevant party is benefiting 
from and would like to see maintained is on land owned by a statutory body.  
 
In Dear v Thames Valley42 it was held that the principles of Leakey and the measured duty of 
care have no application to public authorities. The responsibilities of public authorities must 
be determined with regard to the specific statutes governing them, even where (as in the Dear 
case) the behaviour complained of is not a breach of statutory duty.  
 
However, the subsequent Bybrook Barn case43 opens up a limited possibility for claimants by 
distinguishing two situations involving public authorities. The court held that in the line of 
cases culminating in Dear, the claimants had effectively been seeking to use the private law 
of nuisance to compel a public authority to carry out a public duty (in Dear, to address a 
flooding situation that impacted on many householders in the area). In other words, by using 
a private law remedy they were effectively seeking to avoid a consideration of budgets, 
priorities and other such policy decisions that a public authority must carry out before taking 
any action and into which it is not the court’s place to interfere.  
 
On the other hand, the situation in the Bybrook Barn case was of a claimant suffering 
flooding damage caused by a culvert built by and under the control of the public authority, 
which it would have had a statutory duty to enlarge (which would have prevented the flood 
damage suffered) had it been served with notice to do so. It would therefore not be open to 
the public authority to rely on considerations of budget, priorities or other policy decisions to 
justify not carrying out the work and so the claimant was not seeking to avoid this public law 
element by using the private law of negligence.  
 
It is also worth noting that, although the majority of the statutory basis for flood defences is 
premised on the various statutory authorities having a power to do various things (rather than 
                                                          
42 (1992) 33 Con LR 43 (QBD). 
43 Bybrook Barn Garden Centre Limited v Kent County Council (n 6). 
a duty, as we saw above), if a statutory authority chooses to exercise one of its powers it will 
then be under a duty to avoid making the situation worse.44 In other words, if a statutory 
authority chooses to act in exercise of a power granted to it, it will be under a duty (as framed 
above) to ensure that its actions do not cause damage over and above that which would have 
been caused had the statutory authority not acted at all.  
 
Summary 
What does the current state of the law on nuisance and negligence offer then to our claimant 
seeking to require a defendant to maintain a flood defence on its property? If the defendant is 
(or should be) aware that the flood defence is in poor repair and that as a result of this 
flooding may occur which may damage the claimant’s property, then the defendant will be 
under a duty to do what is reasonable in the circumstances to try and prevent that damage.  
 
However, the key point for claimants to consider is that such a duty may not extend to 
carrying out any required repairs, especially if they are likely to involve a considerable 
amount of expenditure (this is the ‘measured duty of care’). Moreover, if the duty is held to 
extend to such carrying out of repairs, it is possible that the claimant may be required to 
contribute to the cost of such repairs, which may render a claim less attractive to a claimant.  
 
The duty is also unlikely to be established where the defendant is a public authority, unless it 
would have a duty to carry out such repairs under a statutory scheme (after the service of any 




Liability to repair flood defences 
The territory of prescription45 at first provides promising ground for the basis of a claim to a 
right to be defended from flooding. Indeed, Hudson v Tabor46 confirmed that it is possible for 
a prescriptive liability to maintain flood defences to arise and the Coast Protection Act 1949, 
                                                          
44 East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent [1941] AC 74 (HL). 
45 In which a right over a property is acquired through long use provided there has been no force, secrecy or 
permission. There are three separate methods of prescription, but for present purposes the key element to all 
three is that there has been long use of a right (at least 20 years) supported by a legal fiction that such long use 
must presume a grant of the right at some point in history. A common example would be the acquisition of a 
right of way over a track through a piece of land through the long use of that track.  
46 (1877) 2 QBD 290 (CA). 
for example, expressly recognises pre-existing obligations to undertake coast protection 
works (including obligations arising by prescription) and provides that they continue to apply 
notwithstanding the 1949 Act. However, on closer inspection, it is difficult to see how this 
possibility could be translated into anything useful in practice for flood defence claimants.  
 
The court in Hudson v Tabor did not consider what would be required to prove a prescriptive 
liability, although a small number of subsequent cases have dealt with the issue. In Jones v 
Price47 the facts concerned alleged liability for repairing a boundary hedge and the court held 
that prescriptive liability could arise in theory. However, the claimant would have to show 
that the defendant did more than merely carry out repairs over the requisite period of time; 
rather, that the defendant carried out such repairs ‘as a matter of obligation’48 to the claimant. 
Scarman LJ affirmed this requirement in Egerton v Harding,49 and added that it was doubtful 
whether prescription could be established (without further evidence) where the acts of repair 
are ‘as consistent with voluntary choice as with obligation’.50 This line of reasoning means 
that a claimant seeking to establish that a defendant is required to repair and maintain flood 
defences that benefit the claimant by virtue of prescription will face a tricky task in proving 
that the acts of repair on which the claim is based were conducted only under an obligation to 
the claimant and not voluntarily.  
 
However, supposing for the moment that a claimant were able to satisfy the requirements in 
Jones v Price and Egerton v Harding, the question becomes one of benefits, burdens and 
successors in title. The general rule is that a right to have something done (such as to have 
flood defences repaired) is not an easement.51 This means that the prescriptive liability that 
has been established must be a positive covenant, which is therefore incapable of running 
with the land and binding any successors.52  
 
It is possible that this general rule is a mistake. Waite53 argues that the position taken by Gale 
is a relatively recent rule and that it is therefore possible that some positive easements may 
                                                          
47 [1965] 2 QB 618 (CA). 
48 ibid 636 (Wilmer LJ). 
49 [1975] QB 62 (CA). 
50 ibid 68–69. 
51 Jonathan Gaunt QC and the Hon Mr Justice Morgan Gale on the Law of Easements (19th edn Sweet & 
Maxwell 2012) 1–78. 
52 See Austerberry v Oldham Corporation (1885) 29 Ch D 750 (CA). 
53 A J Waite ‘Easements: positive duties on the servient owner?’ (1985) 44(3) Cambridge Law Journal 458. 
have survived.54 Waite notes that historical case law shows that easements that were positive 
in nature were enforced and that no distinction appeared to be made between positive and 
negative easements. However, whatever the merit in this interesting line of reasoning, even 
Waite acknowledges that following the ruling by the Court of Appeal in Rance v Elvin,55 it 
will take a decision by the Supreme Court to overturn the current position of the law, whether 
that current position is mistaken or not.  
 
Waite goes on to argue56 that it could be possible, despite the ruling in Rance v Elvin and the 
earlier decision in Austerberry v Oldham Corporation,57 for a positive repair covenant to run 
with the land and bind successors in title where that positive repair covenant is annexed to an 
easement. However, the reasoning undertaken by Waite relies upon distinguishing 
Austerberry (in which the Court of Appeal held that the burden of a positive covenant does 
not pass to successors in title, either in equity or at common law) from the earlier case of 
Holmes v Buckley58 and construing a line of case law starting with Holmes. What Waite 
declines to note is that Lindley LJ doubted Holmes in the Austerberry case on the basis that 
the reporting of Holmes was not accurate enough to permit it to be a guide.59 It therefore 
seems questionable that a court could be convinced to follow Waite’s line of reasoning and 
depart from Austerberry to hold that a servient owner can be liable to repair the subject 
matter of an easement.  
 
A prescriptive easement for flood defences? 
Using Waite’s line of reasoning, however, a positive repairing liability could possibly be 
annexed to an easement. In these circumstances, could a landowner establish a prescriptive 
easement for the benefit of flood defences?  
 
Starting with the classic test for the existence of an easement in Re Ellenborough Park,60 
there is a clear servient tenement (the land on which the flood defences sit) and dominant 
tenement (the land which benefits from the flood defences by being exposed to flooding less 
                                                          
54 Indeed, in his historical assessment of the remedies for non-feasance, Waite includes reference to the writ of 
reparari facias in respect of an obligation to repair sea walls.  
55 (1985) 50 P & CR 9 (CA): the Court of Appeal overturned the previous High Court decision but upheld 
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59 Austerberry (n 57) 782. 
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than it would ordinarily be) and we can assume separate owners of these tenements. The 
possible easement would also be for the benefit of the dominant tenement in that it would 
allow the enjoyment of the dominant tenement uninterrupted by flooding and the consequent 
damage which that could bring. Assuming that the prospective dominant and servient 
tenements are close enough together to satisfy the requirement for propinquity, the important 
limb of the test to focus on is therefore whether a right to benefit from flood defences on 
another landowner’s land is capable of forming the subject matter of a grant.  
 
It is submitted that this is where a claimant would struggle. If the easement is formulated as a 
right for the dominant owner to benefit from the flood defences already existing on the 
servient owner’s land, then this is a wholly negative easement; the dominant owner does not 
have to do anything but enjoy the benefit of the flood defences (similar to enjoying the 
benefit of light or television reception). As alluded to by Lord Hope of Craighead in Hunter v 
Canary Wharf Ltd,61 the categories of negative easement are now all but closed and such an 
easement as described above does not appear within them. It is therefore extremely unlikely 
that an easement formulated in this way could be acquired by prescription. Indeed (and as 
was suggested by Lord Denning MR in Phipps v Pears),62 the way for the landowner to 
protect himself in this situation is through the agreement of a restrictive covenant preventing 
the flood defences from being removed.  
 
If, in the alternative, the easement is formulated as a right for the dominant owner to go onto 
the servient owner’s land and maintain and repair a pre-existing flood defence, then a 
prescriptive claim may be possible. Indeed, in Simpson v Godmanchester Corporation63 the 
House of Lords upheld an easement permitting the dominant corporation to go onto the 
servient land to open up sluice gates and locks belonging to the servient owner so as to 
prevent flooding on the corporation’s land. It is submitted that the entry onto servient land to 
repair flood defences is analogous to these facts. However, should a claimant manage to 
establish such a prescriptive easement, it would be for the claimant to carry out and fund the 
repairs64 and so it may well be the case that such a right would be of little practical use to 
many facing the risk of flooding today.  
                                                          
61 [1997] AC 655, 726 (HL). 
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64 See Taylor v Whitehead (1781) 2 Doug KB 745, in which it was held that a servient owner is not bound to 
repair the subject matter of an easement and that if the dominant owner wants it repaired then it is for that 
 
Thus, it can be seen that, in our circumstances, the only easement a claimant is likely to have 
any prospect of being able to establish is an easement allowing the dominant tenement owner 
to enter the servient tenement in order to maintain and repair the flood defences itself. In such 




This article has not considered the prospects of a successful claim under legitimate 
expectation instead of prescription. A legitimate expectation is an expectation on the part of a 
claimant that he or she will be treated in a certain way by an administrative authority, despite 
there being no other legal basis on which to rest such a claim. Legitimate expectations arise 
out of the behaviour of an administrative authority (being either a representation or promise 
made by it or consistent past practice) and allow a court to hold that such an expectation 
could not be fairly disregarded.65  
 
It is beyond the scope of this article to review all the correspondence between government 
agencies and landowners that would be necessary to establish a claim to a legitimate 
expectation. Furthermore, since a legitimate expectation arises because of a reliance on 
specific government promises, it can be seen as the creation of a right through political rather 
than intrinsically legal mechanisms. A claim could easily be circumvented by government 




The claimant who has managed to establish a prescriptive liability on the part of a defendant 
to repair a flood defence is therefore left in a vulnerable position. Whilst it may be possible to 
establish a prescriptive liability, such a liability is unlikely to be binding on successors in title 
and is therefore of reduced use to claimants seeking effective protection from flooding.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
dominant owner to do so himself. See also Gale on the Law of Easements (n 51) 1–94, in which it is noted that 
generally both the dominant owner and the servient owner have a right to repair the subject matter of an 
easement, but that neither party can require a contribution to such repairs from the other party unless there is 
some express right to do so.  
65 See R v Devon County Council, ex parte Baker [1995] 1 All ER 73, 88–89 (Simon Brown LJ) (CA) for an 
explanation of the four categories of legitimate expectation that may arise. 
Commutation 
 
It should be noted at this point that if a duty to repair flood defences could be established 
through prescription, the issue of commutation must be considered. Where the flood risk the 
defences are designed to protect from emanates from a ‘main river’, then the Environment 
Agency66 is under a duty67 to commute any private repairing obligations arising out of tenure, 
custom68 or prescription.69 Commutation briefly entails the Environment Agency taking on 
the duty in return for a payment by the duty holder of a sum equal to the estimated costs of 
fulfilling that duty for 30 years.70 Following commutation the duty rests with the 
Environment Agency in perpetuity.  
 
Designation as a ‘main river’ is usually given to larger rivers and streams, but the 
designations vary across England and Wales.71 Duties relating to flood defences on ordinary 
watercourses (those not designated as ‘main rivers’) can be commuted by the relevant 
internal drainage board or lead local flood authority, but there is no duty to do so.72  
 
It could therefore be the case that the Environment Agency (or Natural Resources Wales) is 
under a duty to maintain and repair flood defences in certain locations following previous 
commutations. Equally, they may find themselves subject to such a duty if a claimant is able 
to prove a repairing liability that is eligible for or requires commutation. The extent of the 
duty that the Environment Agency is or will be subject to in such circumstances is not clear 
from the wording of the relevant statutes, but it is submitted that it is unlikely that the duty 
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70 See Land Drainage Act 1991 s 34 for further details of the calculations involved. 
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Simon Jackson Wisdom’s Law of Watercourses (6th edn Sweet & Maxwell 2011) for further commentary on 
designation of main rivers. 
72 Land Drainage Act 1991 s 33, as amended by the Flood and Water Management Act 2010 Sched 2 para 35. 
would be interpreted as requiring repairs and maintenance to a greater standard than that 
required at the time of commutation.  
 
Duty to maintain coastline 
 
It might be possible, in very limited circumstances, to establish a duty to maintain73 the 
coastline; however, this is not likely to be much help to those at risk from rising sea levels 
and the effects of managed realignment.  
 
In Attorney General v Tomline74 the plaintiff’s land was adjacent to the sea and was 
frequently below the spring tide high-water level. It was protected only by a natural barrier on 
the beach, formed from shingle. The defendant, lord of the manor and claiming to be owner 
of the foreshore, had been taking shingle from the barrier and selling it for ballast. The Court 
of Appeal upheld the injunction granted to the plaintiff to prevent the defendant from 
removing any further shingle, holding that it is a duty of the Crown to ‘save and defend the 
realm from encroachments of the sea’,75 either by maintaining natural barriers or by erecting 
artificial barriers.  
 
Such a duty is imperfect as it cannot be enforced against the Crown. However, in upholding 
the injunction, the judges took two different lines of reasoning, both arriving at the same 
conclusion. For Brett LJ, whilst the Crown’s duty is an imperfect one, the separate tenet that 
a subject cannot do something that it would be unlawful for the Crown to do means that 
subjects who come into the ownership of land previously held by the Crown (as all foreshore 
once was) cannot do anything to a natural sea barrier to allow the sea to come through and 
cause damage by flooding. For Cotton LJ, the Crown’s duty attached to the land so that when 
the land was subsequently granted to a subject, it could not be granted free from that duty, so 
that a subject cannot use the land in any way that would destroy the natural barrier against the 
sea.  
 
Therefore, where land is protected from the sea by a natural flood defence, although there is 
no enforceable obligation upon anybody to maintain such a defence, it will be unlawful for 
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any party to remove the defence or any part of it if that would expose the relevant land to the 





As our tour through the various avenues of statute and common law has shown, there is very 
little in the way of prospects for those seeking to claim the benefit of flood defences not 
situated on their property other than a possible claim in nuisance and a hope that the 
government will step in. However, the prospect of flooding damage is one that increasing 
numbers of us will have to face in the coming years if sea levels rise as predicted and 
instances of extreme weather become even more frequent than at present. How we as a 
society respond to these pressures will probably need to include reconsidering our current 
notion of the fixed allocation of land, particularly where this is in conflict with nature’s 
intentions (as on the Somerset levels and in Fairbourne). 
